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Abstract 
The impact of natural hazards on hazardous installations can cause major chemical accidents. This so-called 
“Natech” risk is increasing due to industrialisation and climate change. Capacity building in EU Member States, 
Candidate Countries and EU Neighbourhood Countries on Natech risk assessment is required for effective 
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Executive summary 
The impact of natural hazards on hazardous installations can cause major chemical 
accidents with severe secondary consequences on the population, the environment and 
the regional, national or sometimes even global economy. This so-called “Natech” risk is 
increasing due to more industrialisation, climate change, and community encroachment 
on natural-hazard zones.  
In order to support new EU Member States and Candidate Countries in the 
implementation of the EU acquis communautaire related to risk assessment for chemical-
accident prevention and preparedness, as well as EU Neighbourhood Countries in building 
capacity in this field, the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre organised a 
training workshop on Natech risk assessment and risk reduction on 16-17 March, 2016. 
This workshop was organised through the JRC’s Enlargement and Integration Action 
Programme 2015.  
The workshop showed that the participating countries are experiencing the same 
difficulties related to Natech risk reduction as EU and OECD countries: 
1. The Natech risk in some countries may be very high, as many countries are subject to 
natural hazards and hazardous industries are located in natural-hazard prone areas. 
2. Some countries have already experienced Natech accidents in their territory. In 
addition, the threat of a cross-boundary Natech accident is a high concern for some 
countries. 
3. Frameworks for chemical-accident prevention and preparedness exist, but Natech 
risks are rarely considered. 
4. In many cases, competences associated to chemical accident and Natech risk 
reduction are distributed across different ministries and require good coordination 
between ministries to achieve maximum effectiveness. 
5. Countries expressed a strong need for Natech risk-assessment methodologies and 
tools, guidance on Natech risk reduction, Natech risk mapping, early warning 
systems, and awareness raising and training. 
6. Several countries are interested in mitigation and response strategies when there are 
also impacts on infrastructure from natural disasters that could hinder the response 
to the Natech event or exacerbate its effects. 
7. Several countries indicated a need to apply land-use planning and defensive 
measures to reduce vulnerability to Natech accidents. 
8. A number of countries mentioned a need to purchase equipment to help with 
response to a Natech event. 
The feedback of the workshop participants on the two days of the training was very 
positive, with a strong interest shown in risk assessment in general, Natech risk 
assessment in particular, and in learning about the JRC’s RAPID-N tool for rapid Natech 
risk assessment and mapping, and its capabilities. This indicates a strong interest in risk 
assessment as a process to increase industrial safety, and in the available associated 
support tools. The JRC will continue the development of RAPID-N, with the deployment of 
a prototype for flood Natech risk assessment planned for autumn 2017, and it will 
continue to offer training courses on the subject. These courses can be held as bilateral 
training workshops in the requesting country or, if preferred, at the JRC. 
2 
1 Introduction 
The impact of natural hazards on hazardous installations has caused major chemical 
accidents worldwide with severe secondary consequences on the population, the natural 
and built environment and the regional, national or sometimes even global economy via 
direct and indirect losses, supply-chain disruptions and price hikes. This so-called 
“Natech” risk1 is increasing due to more industrialisation, climate change, and community 
encroachment on natural-hazard zones. This has been recognized in a recent amendment 
of the European Union’s Seveso Directive in which the need to protect against Natech 
risks has been rendered explicit. However, there is a lack of methodologies and tools to 
help countries identify Natech hotspots in their territory and to assess and mitigate the 
associated risk levels2. 
In order to support new EU Member States and Candidate Countries in the 
implementation of the EU acquis communautaire related to risk assessment for chemical-
accident prevention and preparedness, as well as EU Neighbourhood Countries in building 
capacity in this field, the Natech project at the European Commission’s Joint Research 
Centre (JRC) organised a training workshop on “Risk Assessment for Natural-Hazard 
Impact on Hazardous Chemical Installations” on 16-17 March, 2016. The objectives of 
the workshop were: 
1. Introduce different risk assessment approaches and familiarize the participants with 
the concept of Natech risk; 
2. Present the JRC’s RAPID-N framework for rapid Natech risk assessment and mapping 
and demonstrate its use for screening for Natech risk hot spots in countries and 
regions by providing hands-on training; 
3. Build capacity in identifying, preventing and preparing for Natech risks on specific 
sites and across a geographic area. 
This workshop was organised through the JRC’s Enlargement and Integration Action 
Programme 2015 in the frame of which the JRC offers specialized workshops and 
advanced training courses within its area of competence. These workshops are 
established to allow competent organizations in in the new Member States, Candidate 
Countries, Potential Candidate Countries, Horizon 2020 Associated Countries, and 
European Neighbourhood Policy Countries to study the scientific and technical methods 
and techniques underpinning EU policy implementation. Several representatives from EU 
Member States (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Malta, and The Netherlands) also 
attended the capabity-building workshop. 
This workshop also supported the goals of the project “Seveso Capacity Building in EU 
Neighbourhood Countries” under the direction of the European Commission’s Directorate 
General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (DG ECHO) and implemented by the 
Major Accident Hazards Bureau (MAHB) on behalf of DG ECHO.  
 
                                          
1 Natech: Natural-hazard triggered technological accident 
2 E. Krausmann, A.M. Cruz, E. Salzano (2017) Natech risk assessment and management – Reducing the risk of 
natural-hazard impact on hazardous installations, Elsevier, Amsterdam. 
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2 Natech risk assessment, risk reduction and mapping 
The objective of this training workshop was to demonstrate the importance of risk 
assessment as a tool to augment industrial-safety levels by improving the risk 
management at hazardous chemical installations. It included an introductory module to 
familiarize the workshop participants with basic risk concepts and the different 
approaches to industrial risk assessment. The training workshop also provided an 
overview of natural-hazard induced equipment failure modes and their consequences, 
available risk-reduction measures for selected natural hazards based on lessons learned 
from accident analysis, and it highlighted the potential pitfalls in Natech risk 
management. 
The second module of the training workshop introduced the procedure for Natech risk 
assessment, and the JRC’s RAPID-N tool for rapid Natech risk assessment and mapping. 
The participants were guided step by step through an earthquake case study with RAPID-
N and then worked on their own test case. The training also addressed the interpretation 
of RAPID-N’s results for further use in land-use and emergency planning, as well as for 
Natech damage assessment. 
2.1 Natech risk assessment and reduction 
The workshop started with an introduction of the definition of “Natech accident” to make 
sure that participants had a common understanding of the term. For the purpose of this 
workshop, a Natech accident was defined as a chemical accident caused by a natural 
hazard, such as a flood, earthquake, landslide etc. In this context, chemical accidents 
include accidental oil and chemical spills, gas releases, and fires or explosions involving 
hazardous substances from fixed establishments (e.g. petrochemical, pharmaceutical, 
pesticide, storage depots) and oil and gas pipelines. This was followed by examples of 
recent major Natech accidents, an introduction of the characteristics of Natech events 
and the challenges they pose in terms of prevention, preparedness and response, and 
the current Natech risk-reduction situation based on a survey of EU and OECD countries3. 
The key messages from the first presentation are: 
• Industrial accidents caused by natural disasters can create major secondary disasters 
that can affect the population, the environment, the economy and the supply chain. 
• Natech risk is a risk class of global relevance and requires a targeted risk-
management approach.  
• Natech risk reduction is hampered by the scarcity of methodologies and tools to 
analyze and map Natech risk, and a lack of guidance on Natech risk management. 
• Natech risk is expected to increase in the future due to the presence of more hazards 
(both natural and technological) and the increasing vulnerability of society. 
The second training slot introduced the workshop participants to the most common 
Natech damage mechanisms, presented selected lessons learned from the analysis of 
Natech accidents caused by earthquakes, floods, lightning and low temperatures, and 
provided examples of measures to protect hazardous installations against impacts by 
these natural hazards. In this context, the JRC’s eNATECH database, a repository on 
Natech accident and near miss data, was presented. The structure of this database is 
unique in that it was specifically designed for the collection and analysis of Natech events 
with their distinctive features. The eNATECH database is a public database which can be 
accessed at: http://enatech.jrc.ec.europa.eu. The key messages from this session are: 
• The chemical industry is vulnerable to natural-hazard impact but this is not always 
recognized. 
                                          
3 E. Krausmann, D. Baranzini (2012) Natech risk reduction in the European Union, Journal of Risk Research 
15(8), 1027. 
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• The most vulnerable equipment type are atmospheric storage tanks with a high 
storage capacity and a high likelihood of release during natural hazards. 
• The design basis of hazardous installations is not always adequate for natural-hazard 
loading and design limits need to be understood and acknowledged. 
• Natech risk-reduction measures are available for several natural hazards and 
research is ongoing to fill existing data and knowledge gaps. 
The third presentation introduced the fundamentals of industrial risk assessment. It gave 
an overview of the general risk-analysis process which aims to answer the three main 
questions of risk analysis: 1) What can go wrong?, 2) How likely is it?, and 3) What are 
the consequences? The different risk-assessment approaches commonly used (qualitative 
and quantitative) were also addressed, including a more detailed discussion of accident 
consequences in general, and the JRC’s ADAM tool for consequence analysis in particular. 
Examples of risk-acceptability criteria and uncertainties inherent in the risk-assessment 
process (models, input data, level of detail of the analysis) were also given. This 
presentation’s key messages are: 
• Risk assessment is a structured process to identify hazards and assess the risk 
associated with them. 
• The completeness of the risk analysis can never be ensured. 
• Due to the many inherent uncertainties in the risk-assessment process, the final risk 
figure gives only an indication of the risk level. However, the overall process of risk 
analysis helps to identify system weaknesses and to prioritize the implementation of 
safety measures.  
After the introduction of the fundamentals of industrial risk assessment, the next 
presentation discussed the specific case of Natech risk assessment which differs in some 
important aspects from conventional risk assessment (e.g. the necessity to consider 
multiple and simultaneous release scenarios common during Natech accidents). In fact, 
regardless of the risk-assessment approach chosen, extensions to both qualitative and 
quantitative risk assessment are necessary to fully consider Natech characteristics. The 
presentation outlined the individual steps in Natech risk assessment and gave detailed 
examples of the issues to be addressed for every step. It also emphasized potential 
pitfalls that attention should be paid to (e.g. the need to consider the reactivity of some 
chemicals with water in case of Natech accidents caused by floods, heavy rain or 
tsunamis, or the fact that implemented protection measures may have been rendered 
non-functional by the very natural hazard that caused the Natech accident). The key 
messages of this presentation are: 
• The development of Natech risk assessment and mapping tools is a high-priority need 
to understand where Natech risk zones are. 
• Natech risk assessment requires additional assessment steps and models as 
compared to conventional industrial risk assessment. 
• The JRC has developed the RAPID-N framework for rapid Natech risk assessment and 
mapping which can be used to quickly identify Natech risk hotspots. 
2.2 Introduction to RAPID-N and case-study scenarios 
The second module of the training workshop was entirely dedicated to introducing the 
JRC’s RAPID-N tool and providing hands-on training on its use. RAPID-N is a unique, 
web-based assessment and mapping framework that unites a natural-hazards module 
which calculates natural-hazard severities at the site of the hazardous installations, an 
industrial plants and units module which provides all data related to the installation and 
its units, and a risk-assessment module in which the equipment damage from the natural 
hazard is assessed using fragility curves, and the site risk assessment is performed. A 
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property estimation framework, which helps the user carry out a Natech risk assessment 
with a minimum of data input, is an integral part of RAPID-N4,5.  
RAPID-N is currently implemented for assessing earthquake impacts at fixed chemical 
installations. It also includes a draft implementation of assessing the risk to oil and gas 
pipelines under seismic loading. RAPID-N is available at: http://rapidn.jrc.ec.europa.eu. 
The tool is public and use is for free. However, prior authorization by the JRC is required 
for using its risk assessment functionality. 
The risk-assessment process with RAPID-N was demonstrated by guiding the workshop 
participants step by step through a case study that estimated the impact of the Istanbul 
earthquake scenario on a hazardous installation that suffered significant damage during 
the 1999 Kocaeli earthquake. Subsequently, participants worked on their own RAPID-N 
example country case study using 21 hazardous installations and credible earthquake 
scenarios. 
For this purpose, earthquake scenarios were taken from the earthquake database of 
RAPID-N which provides world-wide earthquake data for M > 5.5 starting from 1970. 
Since also hazard maps (ShakeMaps) were available in RAPID-N, users did not have to 
collect earthquake hazard data but could use what was provided by RAPID-N. The JRC 
suggested an industrial plant for analysis for each country based on its importance 
(related to dimensions). In most cases a refinery was selected, but for some countries 
storage terminals were suggested instead. The participants were free to work on one of 
the installations suggested by the JRC or choose another plant for the hands-on study. 
For the chosen installation, the participants delineated its boundary in RAPID-N and 
entered site (urban/rural area, soil conditions) and operator data based on public 
information available online. They then mapped the storage tanks in the facility by using 
the mapping tool built into RAPID-N. This allowed the mapping of units, which included 
dimensions (e.g. diameter) and characteristics (e.g. roof type) in a very short time 
period. Some participants entered tens of units during the exercise. 
Subsequently, the Natech risk assessment with RAPID-N was demonstrated in two steps: 
1) damage assessment where data on the chemical substance was missing, and 2) risk 
assessment if substance data was available. If substance information is missing, RAPID-N 
cannot calculate the consequences of hazardous-substance releases and instead stops 
after the calculation of the damage to units caused by the earthquake. In this case the 
tool calculates equipment damage probabilities by estimating onsite hazard parameters 
and choosing the most appropriate fragility curve for each unit based on the unit 
characteristics. The participants saw how missing data is automatically completed by 
RAPID-N and how the results are reported. 
For the second step, participants provided substance information by selecting flammable 
or toxic substances from the RAPID-N database. The users did not have to collect data on 
the chosen chemicals because the database also includes physico-chemical properties of 
substances. With this information, the risk assessment was re-run and RAPID-N created 
possible accident scenarios and calculated the end-point distances of the associated 
consequences (toxic effects and burns). The participants learned how the results of the 
risk assessment are reported and mapped. 
RAPID-N performed well during the exercise with a rapid completion of the case-study 
calculations in spite of the about 20 risk-assessment test cases that were run 
simultaneously. Furthermore, participants used different platforms for running RAPID-N, 
such as Windows and OS X laptops, as well as Android tablets. The user experience was 
the same in all cases. 
                                          
4 S. Girgin, E. Krausmann (2013) RAPID-N: Rapid Natech risk assessment and mapping framework, Journal of 
Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, 26, 949. 
5 S. Girgin (2012) RAPID-N: Rapid Natech Risk Assessment Tool - User Manual, version 1.0. JRC Scientific and 
Policy Report EUR 25164 EN. 
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3 Country presentations 
All countries invited to the workshop were asked to prepare a brief country presentation 
that would address the following five questions: 
i. Which natural hazards are a major concern in your country and which regions are 
exposed to these hazards? 
ii. Are there any major industries (e.g. refineries, hazardous facilities, and pipelines) 
located in natural-hazard regions? If yes, please list the main industries. 
iii. Did any Natech accidents happen in your country in the past? If yes, please list 
the major ones. 
iv. Do regulations, codes or practices for chemical-accident prevention or civil 
protection in your country address the risk of natural-hazard impacts on 
hazardous industry? If yes, for which natural hazards? 
v. What would be the main needs in your country to ensure effective Natech risk 
reduction? 
Two EU Member States, Malta and The Netherlands, also prepared a country 
presentation. The brief country profiles below are a summary of these presentations. 
Albania 
The Albanian territory is subject to geological (earthquakes, landslides and rock falls), 
meteorological (floods, heavy rain, snowstorms, windstorms) and bio-physical (forest 
fires) hazards. The largest landslides have developed in the basins of the main 
hydropower plants of Fierza, Vau I Dejes and Banja. The Buna and Drini River basin in 
the North West and the Semani River basin in the South West are at risk of floods and 
heavy rain, while the North East of Albania is subject to snow and storms. Oil wells 
(Bankers petroleum) and oil storage in Durres are located in flood zones. The Trans 
Adriatic Pipeline Project is in the first phase but will pass areas subject to flood and snow 
hazards. 
Albanian Civil Protection collaborates with universities and different ministries to address 
the natural hazards Albania is subject to. New national strategies are harmonized with EU 
regulations and initiatives. For effective Natech risk reduction, there is a need to: 
1. Increase awareness and government preparedness; 
2. Increase attention to this problem by hazardous industry and other possible investors 
in Albania; 
3. Test of the National Emergencies Plan in particular in the areas at risk. 
Algeria 
Several regions in Algeria are subject to very high earthquake and flood risk. Floods are 
often caused by torrential rains when the water absorption by the ground is hampered 
due to the impermeability of the soil in urban areas. Most high-risk industrial installations 
are located in the North of Algeria, which is also a highly seismic zone but to date no 
Natech accidents have been registered. 
Out of the 48 departments in Algeria, 25 are considered to have high to very high 
industrial risk. Algeria has six major risk areas which have been declared by Executive 
Decree. One of these areas, the industrial zone of Skikda, is both flood- and tsunami 
prone. Similar to the EU, also in Algeria the competent authorities shall ensure that the 
operator of a hazardous installation is obliged to take all measures necessary to prevent 
major accidents and to limit their consequences for people and the environment. 
Legislation on the prevention of major risks and disaster management in the context of 
sustainable development (Law No. 04-20, December 25-2004) provides measures and 
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tasks to be undertaken by national institutions before (prevention plan for each major 
risk) and after a disaster (emergency planning).  
In terms of needs related to Natech risk reduction, the following items were identified for 
Algeria: 
1. Integration of disaster risk reduction into policies and plans for sustainable 
development; 
2. Development and strengthening of institutions, mechanisms and capacities to build 
resilience to hazards; 
3. Risk-analysis tools; 
4. Preparation of Natech risk maps. 
Armenia 
Although prone to many different natural hazards, 80% of the Armenian territory is 
subject to severe earthquake risk with four seismic fault lines crossing the country. Other 
important natural hazards are mudflows, flash floods and floods, as well as hail and 
drought. A very small percentage of Armenia is prone to landslides and rockfalls. 
With respect to industrial risks, in Armenia there are 23 registered organisations that use 
chemical substances, e.g. chlorine, ammonia, nitric acid, etc. Over 1,500 enterprises are 
at a risk of fires and explosions. Furthermore, Armenia has 82 water reservoirs, 24 
tailings reservoirs, as well as a nuclear power plant in Metsamor. Several government 
decisions regulate the response to man-made accidents: Decision N861-N of July 2010 
addresses accidents at chemical facilities, while Decisions N 2328-N (December 2005) 
and N8 (March 2016) regulate nuclear and/or radiological accidents on Armenian soil.   
Although to date no Natech accident has been recorded in Armenia, several areas of 
improvement to reduce this risk were suggested: 
1. Development of monitoring, prediction and early-warning systems; 
2. Increase of awareness of government bodies and the population, as well as targeted 
training; 
3. Improvement of regulations related to disaster risk reduction; 
4. Strengthening and expansion of international cooperation in the field of disaster risk 
reduction; 
5. Development and introduction of insurance against losses from disasters.  
Azerbaijan 
Earthquakes are an important hazard in Azerbaijan with magnitude 8.9 refraction zones. 
Mapping of these seismic risk zones together with industrial areas gives an indication of 
Natech hazard hotspots due to earthquakes. Landslides caused by heavy precipitation 
occurred in 2003 including in the Great Caucasus region where oil and gas fields are 
located. Flooding is also an important risk which is triggered by snowmelt, heavy rain or 
flooding of the river Kura. An additional hazard considered natural is the fluctuating level 
of the Caspian Sea which has slowly risen by 2.5 m since 1978. Currently, the sea level is 
again in decline.  
Azerbaijan’s main oil industry is located in and around Baku. Several hazardous 
installations are situated in areas subject to natural hazards, e.g. the Heydar Aliyev Baku 
oil refinery, the Azneft gas processing plant, and the Sangachal oil and gas terminal. In 
addition, several oil and gas pipelines cross Azerbaijan and pass into other countries, e.g. 
the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline, the Baku-Novorossiysk or Northern Route 
Export oil pipeline (NREP), the Baku-Supsa or Western Route Export oil pipeline, and the 
South Caucasus gas pipeline (SCP). 
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The Baku earthquake in 2000 affected production from oil fields via an increase of the oil 
debit from wells and added to the risk of oil spills. Seismic risks are expected for former 
oil wells, and the Ministry of Ecology and Natural Resources requests geophysical data for 
preparedness purposes once oil and gas wells are decommissioned. Floods are a 
recurring threat in Azerbaijan and have on multiple occasions resulted in major 
infrastructure damage although no Natech accident was reported. The Gunashli oil 
explosion is considered to have been caused or influenced by weather (storm conditions). 
The activities of the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR) and of BP 
Azerbaijan are governed by an Action Plan to ensure the preventative and timely 
operational implementation of measures against accidents during production, refining 
and the transportation of hydrocarbons both on- and offshore. The main emergency 
measures during accidents are the Oil Spill Alert and Response Plan of SOCAR and BP’s 
Emergency Action Plan on oil spills at onshore and offshore installations. The risk of 
accidents at hazardous installations is owned by two Ministries. The Ministry of Ecology 
and Natural Resources (MENR) is the coordinating entity which regulates relevant 
structures at the time of an accident, and the Ministry of Emergency Situations (MES) 
which is the national authority in charge of the elimination of accidents (preparedness 
and response). 
The main identified needs related to Natech risk reduction for Azerbaijan are:  
1. Institutional and legal developments (e.g., issuing as MENR or MES when it comes to 
the commissioning of main industries due to their preparedness level); 
2. Capacity building on disaster risk management, with a particular focus on prevention 
and preparedness; 
3. Improvement of forecasting or monitoring technologies; 
4. Application of best practices for chemical-accident mitigation taking into account 
economic factors.  
Croatia 
The Croatian territory is prone to earthquakes, floods, landslides and hurricane-force 
winds in coastal areas (the so-called Bura which can reach wind speeds of about 150 
km/h and can last for several days). More frequent and stronger weather extremes have 
been recorded in Croatia. The country is home to 31 upper-tier and 34 lower-tier 
chemical facilities according to the definition of the EU Seveso Directive. Two important 
hazardous installations are located in zones subject to high natural-hazard risk: the Sisak 
refinery near the river Sava and the crude-oil terminal on Krk Island. 
Croatia suffered a major dam break caused by unprecedented flooding in Gunja in the 
East of the country in 2014. The water level reached a 1,000-year average height of 
1,193 cm. The most severe threat manifested along a length of 67 km on the 
embankment of the Sava River with 12 very critical points. The highest rainfall occurred 
on 14-17 May 2014 with 91 l/m2.  Once the floodwaters receded, around 117,000 m3 of 
waste remained. 
The Framework Agreement on the Sava River Basin, whose establishment is in progress, 
will adopt a protocol on acute situations with the purpose to prevent, prepare for, and 
respond to emergencies, and ensure mutual cooperation between the parties to the 
protocol. Chemical accident prevention is addressed through the Regulation on Major 
Accident Prevention (O.G. 44/14) which transposes the Seveso Directive into national 
law, and the Environmental Protection Act (O.G. 80/13, 153/13 and 78/15). Civil 
protection, which is the remit of the National Protection and Rescue Directorate, is 
regulated by the Civil Protection Act (O.G. 82/15) and the Regulation on Methodology for 
Threat Assessment and for Rescue and Protection Plans (O.G. 30/14 and 76/14). The 
latter includes plans for hazardous industry and units of local self-government.  
In order to ensure effective Natech risk reduction, Croatia indicated a need for: 
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1. Capacity building in risk assessment including Natech accidents, e.g. via dedicated 
workshops, study visits, or projects with interdisciplinary participants; 
2. Dedicated guidelines, manuals and case studies; 
3. Financial support for purchasing equipment for emergency response. 
Egypt  
The most important natural hazard in Egypt is torrential rain that causes flooding. The 
regions that are exposed to this type of hazard are the Nile Valley from Cairo to Aswan, 
the Eastern desert (Red Sea region), the Sinai Peninsula (north and south) and the 
Matrouh region.  
In 1994 heavy rains caused a Natech accident in the village of Dronka, where flammable 
hydrocarbons released from an aviation fuel depot were ignited by a lightning strike. The 
burning kerosene was dispersed throughout the village by the floodwaters, causing major 
human losses and economic damage.  
The risks associated with torrential rain are mitigated by the competent authority 
through identifying and inventorying villages and communities exposed to this type of 
risk, raising awareness and preparedness levels in emergency centres, cleaning and 
developing natural or artificial storm water drains, as well as the building of dams and 
culverts, and the preparation of economic feasibility studies for infrastructure to better 
protect buildings. 
The biggest need for Natech risk reduction in Egypt is capacity building in Natech risk 
management. 
Georgia 
The main natural hazards Georgia is exposed to are floods, landslides and earthquakes. 
The main hazardous activities are related to oil and gas transport (e.g. the Baku-Supsa 
pipeline which transports oil from Azerbaijan to Supsa at the Black Sea; the Baku-Tbilisi-
Cehan oil pipeline and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline that originate in Azerbaijan, 
cross Georgia and end in Turkey), as well as oil terminals and waste storage from 
decommissioned industrial activities. 
Over 100,000 tons of arsenic waste are stored in steel drums in the villages of Tsana and 
Uravi, both of which are located in the flood-prone basin of the Tskhenistskhali and Rioni 
rivers. This risk is not regulated and gives rise to concern, as these rivers are the 
freshwater source for half of Georgia. Any release of arsenic waste into the rivers would 
constitute a serious problem. The optimal solution would be to store the waste in a 
sarcophagus but this is very costly. 
In fact, following an extreme hydro-meteorological event in 2013 which caused flooding 
of the Tskhenistskhali River and a change of the riverbed, the dam at the metallurgical 
plant in Lentekhi was damaged which subsequently resulted in the releases of arsenic 
waste from the steel barrels onsite.  
Currently, hazardous companies are requested to identify all kinds of hazards related to 
their activities and to carry out an environmental impact assessment. In the frame of the 
EU-Georgia agreement it is planned that Georgia will implement the Seveso Directive into 
national law. The Seveso draft is ready and signature is expected by spring 2017. 
Israel 
The main natural hazards in Israel that could threaten hazardous-materials storage are 
earthquakes, floods and forest fires. In particular earthquakes and floods have a 
significant occurrence probability. All of Israel’s territory is earthquake-prone, with high-
risk areas in the Yagur Rift, Beit Shean valley, Eilat, the Arava desert and the Dead Sea 
valley along the Great Rift Valley. Floods occur along the coast, the Jordan valley, and 
the Jehuda and Negev deserts. Every state forest is at risk of wildfires. 
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Hazardous industry potentially threatened by these natural hazards are the fertilizer and 
petrochemical installations in Haifa Bay, Dead Sea factories (potash, magnesium 
chloride, various types of salts), the Mishor Rotem industrial park (e.g. phosphate mining 
and processing), the Ramat Hovav industrial park (e.g. bromine compound industry, 
hazardous waste disposal plant), and Ashdod and Haifa ports. The main concern 
surrounds Israel’s ammonia plants, including the facility in Haifa, which is due to be 
relocated to Mishor Rotem. 
There are no reports of Natech accidents in Israel to date. The Ministry of Environment 
issued a few documents that define how to protect ammonia facilities from earthquakes 
and how to conduct an environmental impact assessment that includes seismic risk. 
However, there are no general laws for Natech risk reduction, and response is limited and 
specific to each hazardous facility. Several actions are proposed for effective Natech risk 
reduction in Israel: 
1. Mapping of the potential risks, their likelihood, and of risk-prone facilities. 
2. Development of a framework for risk reduction that integrates different types of risk, 
both from a technical and organizational point of view, e.g. strengthen infrastructures 
and decrease their proneness to certain accident scenarios, protect sensitive areas, 
and prepare emergency-response procedures in collaboration with the facility 
management in risk-prone areas. 
3. Development of specific regulations for Natech scenarios including support and 
professional guidance in the preparation process, enforcement and monitoring of the 
implementation, as well as updating of safety requirements for hazardous sites 
according to the most likely scenarios. 
Lebanon 
With Lebanon being a small country, most of its regions are prone to natural hazards. 
Multiple fault lines pass through the country, making it vulnerable to earthquakes. Of 
particular concern is the Mount Lebanon thrust off the coast which was only recently 
discovered. Lebanon is also prone to tsunamis. All refineries and oil and gas depots are 
located on the shore, exposing them to earthquake and tsunami hazards. The majority of 
chemical installations in the country belongs to the petrochemical sector. 
No Natech accident has been reported in Lebanon. The country closely collaborates with 
the EU on a national action plan for CBRN incidents which includes accidents triggered by 
natural hazards. The main needs with respect to effective Natech risk reduction are 
related to prevention, preparedness and response. All these steps are included in the 
national response plan for CBRN which should be implemented soon. 
Moldova 
The Republic of Moldova is subject to floods and landslides and some hazardous industry 
in the South of Moldova is located in natural-hazard prone areas. This is, for instance, the 
Apa-Canal liquid chlorine storage in Cahul, Valexchim Ltd. oil storage in Valeni, and 
Danube Logistics Ltd. and the Trans Cargo Terminal in Giurgiuliesti where gasoline and 
diesel fuel are stored in large quantities. All industrial objects located in natural-hazard 
areas (floods) were identified in the frame of a TEIA project which included Ukraine, 
Moldova and Romania. 
Moldova has to date not experienced Natech accidents. It was, however, indicated that 
improvements on the register of installations falling under TEIA might be necessary, 
considering that the related information is divided between three ministries. This 
fragmentation of information might have resulted in Natech accident data not being 
easily available.   
Flood-risk management regulations include measures that aim to prevent flooding and 
minimize the consequences on the population and the environment. This indirectly 
addresses Natech risks. 
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The main needs with respect to effective Natech risk reduction in Moldova are: 
1. Identification of all Natech risks that exist in Moldova; 
2. Development of maps with all hazardous industry, chemical or other, located in all 
natural–hazard regions;  
3. Capacity building to transfer the knowledge related to Natech risks; 
4. Development of guidance on which measures to take in case of Natech accidents; 
5. Development of software tools for risk modeling, and for air and water pollution;  
6. Exchange of experience between industrializing countries in this domain. 
Palestine 
Palestine is vulnerable to the impact of natural hazards, mainly earthquakes, floods, 
landslides, droughts and desertification. However, it has also suffered major damage to 
agriculture and infrastructure by a severe winter storm in 2013. The chemical industry is 
spread throughout the West Bank and includes the manufacturing of different types of 
(petro)chemicals, basic metals, paper, leather, textiles, as well as machinery and 
equipment. These industries are regulated by a number of laws and bylaws that address 
environmental impacts, waste management, public health, worker protection, and 
disaster risk management. 
No Natech accidents have been reported to date. The main needs that were identified 
are: 
1. Preparation of a national program and a public policy related to prevention, 
preparedness and emergency response. 
2. Specific training for staff in disaster risk management and rescue operations. 
3. Legal framework for disaster risk reduction, as existing frameworks are very limited. 
4. Inventory of hazardous industries and the chemical substances they handle. 
5. Equipment and tools for handling chemicals. 
Serbia 
The major natural hazards in Serbia are floods, forest fires, landslides and earthquakes. 
Lately, the risk of flash floods has become increasingly important. Several Seveso upper-
tier establishments are located in natural-hazard regions, e.g. a fertilizer plant, thermal 
power plants, fuel and LPG storage tank farms, a refinery and a petrochemical complex. 
Most Seveso plants are located on river banks. There are also a few non-Seveso mining 
sites in these regions, all of which are prone to floods. In contrast, none of these sites is 
located in areas that exhibit landslide, forest fire, or earthquake risks. 
Serbia has not experienced a Natech accident. However, during the severe floods in 
2014, a number near-miss events occurred when parts of several Seveso upper-tier 
complexes, all of which situated on river banks, were flooded. These installations had 
already been identified as Seveso-type prior to the flooding and had benefitted from the 
implementation of preventive measures, and internal emergency plans had been 
prepared. Thanks to adequate prevention and fast emergency response, these incidents 
did not escalate into Natech accidents. According to the Law on Emergencies and the Law 
on Environmental Protection (for Seveso sites) it is compulsory to consider natural 
hazards as external accident triggers at Seveso installations and all other industrial 
complexes in Serbia. 
A number of requirements were identified to strengthen Natech risk reduction. These 
are: 
1. Better land-use planning; 
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2. More education and detailed planning for prevention, preparedness and response; 
3. Improved cooperation with neighboring and other countries;  
4. More funding to ensure that all defensive measures will be available. 
Ukraine 
The main natural hazards in Ukraine are floods, landslides and earthquakes. In natural-
hazard prone areas there are the main oil, gas and ammonia pipelines of the country, 
and 967 chemical installations, 97 of which handle 1st degree chemical hazards. There is 
a concentration of high-capacity hazardous activities in the Eastern and Central parts of 
the country. In Ukraine a total of about 300,000 tons of hazardous chemicals are handled 
(including 3,800 tons of chlorine and 194,000 tons of ammonia). 
The Natech events that occurred in Ukraine originate with an increase in water flows, 
karst collapse and landslides which have led to the uncontrolled flooding of mines in 
Kalush (Ivano-Frankivsk district in the Carpathians) and Solotvyno (Zakarpattia district). 
As a consequence, in Kalush there is a risk of cross-border pollution runoff into the 
Limnytsya and Mlynivka rivers, which are tributaries of the transboundary Dniester River, 
and therefore a threat to both Ukraine and Moldova. At Solotvyno salt mine a large 
amount of salt water was spilled into the transboundary Tisa River which may cause 
large-scale negative environmental impacts within the territories of Ukraine and 
Romania. Both emergency situations persist to date.  
Ukraine has no specific regulations for Natech risk reduction but the threat is implicitly 
included in the general chemical-accident prevention framework. The Code of civil 
protection regulates the prevention of emergencies and consequence management, 
including at (petro)chemical and pharmaceutical facilities, and oil and gas pipelines. The 
Law on “facilities of increased hazards” regulates the identification of such facilities, 
siting, safety reports and consequence management. Two ministerial orders (27.03.2001 
No. 73/82/64/122 and 17.05.2004 No 87/211) define the methodology for forecasting 
the impact of accidents at industrial installations and transport, as well as associated 
prevention measures for chemical accidents, and describe coordinated response actions 
for nuclear and radiological hazards. 
The main needs of Ukraine for the effective management of chemical accident risks (and 
therefore also Natech risks) are: 
1. Expert assistance in resolving the environmental problems associated with the 
emergency at the Solotvyno salt mine; 
2. Development of methodologies for risk assessment and of risk maps for certain types 
of emergencies (Ukraine has developed a concept for the management of man-made 
and natural risks, however, the methodologies for implementing the concept are not 
available); 
3. Provision of modern detection instruments for pollution for emergency rescue units 
and the chemical and radiometric laboratories of the State Emergency Service. 
Malta 
Malta is considered to be at medium earthquake risk; other natural hazards potentially 
relevant are tsunamis and thunderstorms. Due to the size of the country, a natural 
hazard could affect the entire island. The major storage facilities and industrial 
installations are manly situated in the southern part of Malta. Fuel storage facilities are 
located underground and above ground while fuel pipelines span halfway across the 
country. 
While no Natech accident has happened in Malta, earthquakes could rupture fuel 
pipelines which could under certain conditions cause flammable spills (the pipelines are 
normally kept empty). Similarly, if an earthquake damaged underground fuel tanks with 
subsequent releases in the underground complex it would create groundwater problems 
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and lead to spills of petrochemical products inside the harbors. Tsunamis would affect 
fuel storage facilities as they are all located in the harbor basin. Since Malta has only one 
power station, a tsunami would likely down the whole electrical power generation, except 
possibly the interconnector from Sicily. Thunderstorms could trigger storage tank fires. 
For recently built or planned hazardous installations natural hazards have to be taken 
into account. The Planning Authority consults with the Seveso competent authority 
regarding new sites, however there are no established codes for Natech risk reduction. 
HSE codes are applied as standard practice. Prevention measures for natural risks involve 
lightning protection and measures against flash floods. Newer sites would also include 
protection against earthquake loading from local seismic activity, as well as procedures 
for total shutdown in case of a strong natural event. Older installations are more 
vulnerable to natural hazards as they have not benefitted from the same levels of 
protection as recent or new sites. 
The main needs identified for Natech risk reduction mainly relate to emergency response 
due to oil spills, as well as protection of the population from natural hazards: 
1. Tsunami early warning system to facilitate the alerting and evacuation of the 
population, as well as to ensure departure of ships from the harbor to keep them 
from being washed onshore; 
2. Emergency-response equipment to combat pollution from major oil spills for which 
national resources might be insufficient. 
It was emphasized that in case of a natural-hazard impact, the whole country would be 
affected from a logistics point of view, and electricity generation would potentially be an 
issue. Also, in case of accidents at fuel storage facilities a shortage in fuel supply could 
result. 
 The Netherlands 
The Netherlands are subject to earthquakes, thunderstorms, heavy rain and high tides 
that constitute a hazard. In the southeast, earthquakes are caused by an active rift zone 
while seismic activity in the northeast is induced due to the exploitation of the Groningen 
gas field. Seveso facilities and gas pipelines are located in natural-hazard prone areas. 
The country has experienced a Natech accident when a lightning strike caused a fire at 
the TEAM terminal in the port of Rotterdam in 1998. The rim seals of two large 80 m 
tanks ignited due to lightning impact leading to a major fire.  
In terms of regulatory frameworks, Dutch Seveso facilities have to identify the natural 
hazards they are exposed to and consider them in the site safety assessment. In 
addition, there are a number of regulations and acts that support prevention, 
preparedness and response related to accidents involving high-risk industries. For 
instance, the Dutch External Security Registration Decision requires risk situations with 
hazardous substances to be registered. The Environmental Management Act stipulates 
the conditions that a company must meet to obtain a permit for using or storing 
hazardous substances. From a regional point of view, ministerial regulations describe the 
vulnerable objects and high-risk situations that must be shown on a risk map. The 
Security Regions Act collects first responders (fire department, medical assistance, etc.) 
in a single organization in case of accidents and disasters. 
It was mentioned that exploration work in the gas fields should be reduced to decrease 
the earthquake risk in The Netherlands. Remodeling and the retrofitting of (new) homes 
and structures to decrease their vulnerability to natural hazards, as well as disaster 
reduction are also needed. 
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4 Discussion and outlook 
The workshop showed that the participating countries are experiencing the same 
difficulties related to Natech risk reduction as EU and OECD countries: 
1. The Natech risk in some countries may be very high, as many countries are subject to 
natural hazards and hazardous industries are located in natural-hazard prone areas. 
2. Some countries have already experienced Natech accidents in their territory. In 
addition, the threat of a cross-boundary Natech accident is a high concern for some 
countries. 
3. Frameworks for chemical-accident prevention and preparedness exist, but Natech risks 
are rarely considered. 
4. In many cases, competences associated to chemical accident and Natech risk 
reduction are distributed across different ministries and require good coordination 
between ministries to achieve maximum effectiveness. 
5. Countries expressed a strong need for Natech risk-assessment methodologies and 
tools, guidance on Natech risk reduction, Natech risk mapping, early warning systems, 
and awareness raising and training. 
6. Several countries are interested in mitigation and response strategies when there are 
also impacts on infrastructure from natural disasters that could hinder the response to 
the Natech event or exacerbate its effects. 
7. Several countries indicated a need to apply land-use planning and defensive measures 
to reduce vulnerability to Natech accidents. 
8. A number of countries mentioned a need to purchase equipment to help with response 
to a Natech event. 
Most participants had been aware to some extent of the existence of Natech risks prior to 
the workshop although there was a general belief that this was not necessarily the case 
among practitioners in the invited countries. There was also some recognition that 
climate change might affect the Natech risk situation in many countries, and attention 
might have to be paid to some natural hazards that are currently not considered as 
relevant. This makes targeted Natech prevention and preparedness even more 
important. The participants also acknowledged that the needs of their countries with 
respect to Natech risk reduction were very similar and that it was helpful for them to 
network and exchange information and experiences with other countries. 
The feedback of the workshop participants on the two days of the training was very 
positive, with a strong interest shown in risk assessment in general, Natech risk 
assessment in particular, and in learning about RAPID-N and its capabilities. This 
indicates a strong interest in risk assessment as a process to increase industrial safety, 
and in the available associated support tools. However, almost all participants agreed 
that while the workshop transferred valuable knowledge on Natech risk-assessment 
approaches, the time was too short for providing sufficient hands-on training in the use 
of RAPID-N. It was suggested to organize 3-day training in the future, with more time for 
practical study in small groups. It was also indicated by some participants that this future 
training could be coupled with a RAPID-N user certification process.  
Subsequent to this training workshop, a number of meetings with countries who have 
expressed interest in bilateral contacts have already take place. Several participating 
countries requested that the training be offered also in the future to both EU and non-EU 
countries. The JRC has scheduled another training slot for February 2017 for EU Member 
States. This training will be organized in the frame of the EU Disaster Risk Management 
Knowledge Centre’s Support Service. Further training opportunities exist and can be 
customized to a specific country’s needs. This training can then be held in a specific 
country or, if preferred, at the premises of the European Commission’s Joint Research 
Centre. 
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The Joint Research Centre will continue the development of RAPID-N and will release a 
prototype for flood Natech risk assessment in autumn 2017. This echoes the request of 
some participants who are concerned about flood Natech risk in their countries. We are 
currently exploring the feasibility of linking RAPID-N with the European Flood Alert 
System (EFAS) which could provide near-real time flood information as input for the 
Natech risk assessment. Another future development will concern the inclusion of domino 
effects in RAPID-N, a phenomenon that is more frequent during Natech accidents. 
Considering that the quality of RAPID-N outputs is critically dependent on the reliability of 
the input data used for the risk assessment, some participants asked that the tool be 
shared with national authorities with a request to provide information on the country’s 
hazardous installations in RAPID-N which would then be available for Natech risk 
assessment. In this context it was highlighted that RAPID-N provides full data 
confidentiality to users if they do not want to share their installation data in the RAPID-N 
database or the results of their risk assessment with other users. In order to increase the 
usefulness of the tool, countries could work with the Joint Research Centre to translate it 
into different languages. Due to the setup of RAPID-N this is relatively straightforward 
and would require only little time and effort. 
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